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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the normative problem of redistribution among individuals who can 
influence their longevity through a non-monetary effort but have different taste for effort. As 
benchmarks, we first present the laissez-faire and the first best. In the first best, the level of 
effort is always lower than in the laissez-faire as the social planner takes into account the 
consequences of higher survival on the budget constraint. However, since we suppose that 
effort is private and non-monetary (like exercising), it is reasonable to think that the social 
planner has no control over it. Thus, we modify our framework and assume for the rest of the 
paper that effort is determined by the individual while the social planner only allocates 
consumptions. Under full information with non monitored effort, early consumption is 
preferred to future consumption and the high-survival individual obtains higher future 
consumption. Under asymmetric information, the distortion is identical for the low-survival 
individual while the direction of the distortion for the high-survival individual is ambiguous. 
We finally show how to decentralize these allocations through a perfect annuity market and 
(positive or negative) taxes on annuities. 
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1 Introduction
Is our life expectancy predetermined? To what extent can we modify it? Several
factors may determine human longevity. It surely depends on intrinsic character-
istics (such as gender or heredity) or on environmental and sociocultural factors.
However, individuals certainly have some control over their life expectancy and
may be able to modify it either through monetary investments (for example, un-
dergoing expensive surgery) or through non-monetary ones. In this latter case,
health improving effort can equivalently be exercising, dieting, living a healthy
life, sleeping 8 hours per night, etc.. To illustrate this point, Kaplan et al. (1987)
show that little or no physical activity is associated with higher mortality risks
at all ages. In a more recent study, Okamoto (2006) also finds a significantly
positive relationship between leisure time engaged in sports and the increase in
life expectancy at 65 of Japanese men. More evidence on the relationship be-
tween physical activity and life expectancy can also be found in Ferucci et al.
(1999), Franco et al. (2005, 2006).
Relating these questions to current Social Security debates, the factors and
the consequences of life extension are certainly a matter of public concern. For
instance, several empirical studies (such as Coronado et al. 2000, Liebman
2001 and Bommier et al. 2006) find that life duration differentials reduce intra-
generational redistribution since there is no link between the amount of per pe-
riod pension benefits and expected length of life. For instance, individuals with
lower income obtain higher replacement rates, yet redistribution is partly neu-
tralized due to positive correlation between life expectancy and income. These
studies then highlight the importance of considering redistribution in a life-cycle
framework.
From a theoretical point of view, the contributions of Bommier et al. (2007a,
b) deal with this relation between life duration and Social Security benefits.
They study the optimal pension design when individuals differ in their life ex-
pectancy which they assume to be exogenous. Their paper’s focus is on two main
points. A first technical problem of how to model life expectancy in optimal in-
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come taxation problems: the paper demonstrates that the “double additivity
assumption” (i.e. a utilitarian social planner and additively separable individu-
als’ preferences) implies that individuals exhibit temporal risk neutrality, which
leads to very specific and questionable conclusions in terms of redistribution.1
Their second point concerns optimal taxation results when relaxing the assump-
tion of additive preferences. They find that in the first best optimum, long-lived
individuals should obtain lower per period consumption and work longer while
short-lived individuals should be compensated for their unluckiness by getting
higher per period consumption and retiring earlier.
Quite the opposite, this paper proposes a framework in which individuals’
longevity is only the result of a private (and costly) effort, taking other possi-
ble determinants as fixed, and studies the optimal redistribution problem. We
assume a two-period model in which individuals survive to the second period
with a probability which depends on the level of effort they make in the first
period. Individuals may yet differ in their taste for efforts so that they end up
having different survival probabilities. As opposed to Eeckhoudt and Pestieau
(2006) and Becker and Philipson (1998), we also assume that individuals’ effort
is always non-monetary so that the social planner cannot influence it directly.
We also assume that lifetime utility is additively separable so that individuals
exhibit temporal risk neutrality in our model. As opposed to Bommier et al.
(2007a, b), we decided to retain to this standard formulation in order to empha-
size the role of private efforts on the optimal allocation when it is determined by
the individual prior to the allocation of consumptions by the social planner.2
Under these assumptions, we first present the laissez-faire as a benchmark
case and second we study a (hypothetical) first best problem in which the social
planner allocates consumptions and effort levels. The ensuing result is that the
optimal level of effort is smaller in the first best than in the laissez-faire. This
1On the notion of temporal risk aversion, see Bommier (2006b).
2As it is shown in Bommier (2006a-b) and in Bommier et al. (2007a-b), assuming both
additively separable utility functions and a utilitarian social welfare function implies that indi-
viduals exhibit temporal risk neutrality which leads to the equalisation of consumptions between
individuals with different length of life. Relaxing the assumption of additivity accross time in
the lifetime utility function would surely change our results.
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is due to the fact that in the first best, the social planner takes into account
that effort changes the survival probability which in turn modifies the resource
constraint.3 However, since effort is non monetary, the social planner cannot
decentralize this first best optimum through, e.g. taxation. This is why in
the following, we resort to a constrained first best in which it is assumed that
individuals choose ex-ante the level of their effort.
Thus, in this modified framework, the social planner influences effort only
through the allocation of consumptions. We find that under full information,
future consumption is always lower than present consumption as a way to make
individuals exert less effort and make it tend to its first best level. We also
demonstrate that under specific assumptions on the form of the survival proba-
bility, second period consumption is higher for the individual with higher taste
for effort so that the optimal allocation transfers resources from low-survival
individuals toward high-survival ones. Finally, we study the problem looking at
asymmetric information, when the social planner cannot observe tastes for effort
and effort levels. In this case, the distortion is identical to the full information
one for the low-survival individual so that it is still optimal to encourage early
consumption for this individual. On the contrary, for the high-survival individ-
ual, the trade-off between present and future consumption is modified due to
the introduction of the incentive constraint. Indeed, under asymmetry of infor-
mation with non monitored effort, two effects are playing in opposite directions
for this individual. On the one hand, the social planner wants to encourage
early consumption relative to future consumption so that the individual exerts
lower effort (as under full information with non monitored effort) and on the
other hand, it wants to discourage early consumption so as to satisfy incentive
compatibility constraints (in this case, a low survival individual willing to mimic
a high survival individual would obtain too high a level of future consumption).
Using numerical examples, we find that the overall effect for this individual cru-
cially depends on the gap between individuals’ types and on the elasticity of per
3These findings are closely related to those of Becker and Philipson (1998) who studied the
optimal trade-off between the quantity and the quality of life when health expenditures modify
the length of life.
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period utility with respect to consumption.
We also study how to decentralize these optima through a perfect annuity
market. Under full information and moral hazard constraints, a tax on annuity
is optimal for both types of individuals but his level is higher for the individual
with low-taste for effort. Under asymmetric information, it turns out that in
some cases, a subsidy is desirable for the individual with high-taste for effort.
This paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2, we present the model
and derive the laissez-faire and first best problems. In Section 3, we present a
modified framework with full information and in which the social planner has
no direct control on individuals’ effort while Section 4 sets out the results found
under asymmetric information. Section 5 then gives numerical examples. The
last section concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Individuals’ types and preferences
We consider a stationary population composed of two groups of individuals, in-
dexed by i = 1, 2 who have different tastes for effort γi and represent a proportion
ni of the population. Individuals may live for two periods, each of them with
length normalized to 1. The first time period is certain while individuals survive
to the second period only with probability π (e) ∈ [0, 1] which depends on their
effort level e. We assume that π (.) takes the same form for both individuals and
that π′ (.) > 0, π′′ (.) < 0.4 The individual’s effort is made in first period and it
is assumed to be non-monetary (such as exerting sport, dieting, living a healthy
life) so that it does not enter in the individual’s budget constraint. However,
exerting an effort creates some disutility which depends on the individual’s taste
for effort; this total utility cost is represented by γie and γi can equivalently be
seen as the intensity of effort disutility. Regarding these previous assumptions,
individuals with different tastes for effort may eventually differ in their survival
probability.
4These assumptions on the shape of the survival function are standard (see Eeckhoudt and
Pestieau, 2007). Later in Section 3, we make more precise assumptions on the form of the
survival function.
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Individuals also derive utility from consumption at each period and we denote
c and d, the level of consumption at first and at second periods respectively.
Setting the discount and interest rates equal to zero, the expected lifetime utility
of an individual with taste for effort γi is simply given by:
U
(
c, d, e, γi
)
= π (e)
[
u (c) + u (d)− γie
]
+ (1− π (e))
[
u (c)− γie
]
In our framework, there is no bequest motive so that if the individual dies at
the beginning of the second period, his utility is zero. The above utility function
simplifies to
U i (c, d, e) = u (c) + π (e)u (d)− γie (1)
where for ease of notation, we denote U i (c, d, e) ≡ U
(
c, d, e, γi
)
. Per period
utility of consumption, u (c) and u (d) are such that u′ (.) > 0 and u′′ (.) < 0.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that γ1 > γ2 so that type-1 individuals
are “bad”-type individuals (the ones with high disutility of effort or equivalently
with low taste for effort) while type-2 individuals are “good”-type individuals.
2.2 The laissez-faire
We assume that individuals invest all their savings on a perfect annuity market.
An individual with taste for effort γi determines optimal levels of savings as well
as his optimal level of effort by solving the following problem:
max
si,ei
U i
(
ci, di, ei
)
= u
(
ci
)
+ π
(
ei
)
u
(
di
)
− γiei
s.to
{
ci = w− si
di = Rsi
where si ≥ 0 is the amount of savings made in the first period and R is the rate
of return from annuitized savings obtained in the second period. We assume that
the initial wealth endowment w is exogenous and identical for any individual.
Rearranging first order conditions yield
π
(
ei
)
u′
(
di
)
u′ (ci)
=
1
R
(2)
π′
(
ei
)
u
(
di
)
= γi (3)
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Condition (2) gives the trade-off between present and future consumptions. Al-
ways assuming that insurers can perfectly observe individuals’ survival probabil-
ity and that the market for annuities is actuarially fair, the return from the an-
nuity is set such that R = 1/π
(
ei
)
where the interest rate is implicitely assumed
to be zero. Then u′
(
ci
)
= u′
(
di
)
and individual’s consumption is smoothed
across periods. Yet, if savings are taxed, their return is R′ = (1− t) /π
(
ei
)
with
t ∈ [0, 1] a linear tax rate; in this case, R′ < 1/π
(
ei
)
and first period consump-
tion is higher than second period consumption. We shall use this result in the
following sections.
Condition (3) defines the individual’s preferred level of effort e∗
(
γi, di
)
as
a function of both the level of his second period consumption and of his taste
for effort. It states that at the optimal level, the expected marginal utility of
increased life expectancy must be equal to marginal disutility of effort.5 Note
also that in the laissez-faire, the individual takes the annuity return as given
so that he does not take into account that by choosing a specific level of effort,
he changes the return of the annuity and thus his budget set. Indeed, since R
depends on π
(
ei
)
, increasing ei increases the individual survival chance which
in turn decreases the return of the annuity. In the laissez-faire, the individual
only takes into account the first direct effect and the level of effort is too high
compared to the optimal one.6
We now present the results on the laissez-faire allocation:
Proposition 1 When the annuity market is actuarially fair, the laissez-faire
allocation of a type i individual is such that:
(i) consumption is smoothed across periods: ci = di,
(ii) e∗
(
γi, di
)
is decreasing in γi and increasing in di.
5Under our assumptions, the second order condition π′′ (e)u (d) < 0 is always satisfied.
6This imperfection was first highlighted by Becker and Philipson (1998). When choos-
ing their longevity effort, individuals face a free rider problem; each individual from a same
longevity risk category decides of their longevity effort without taking into account that in
overall, it affects the annuity price.
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This proposition directly follows from the above optimality conditions. In
point (ii), we logically find that individuals with low taste for effort always exert
lower level of effort, for a given level of second period consumption. As we
prove in Appendix A, the level of effort also increases with the level of future
consumption. Indeed, if second period consumption is high, the individual has
more incentives to exert higher effort and to increase his survival probability.
We finally compare individuals’ laissez-faire allocations. Since we assumed w
to be identical between individuals, individuals with different types end up with
identical expected lifetime consumption, defined as ci+π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
di = w ∀i.
But, as consumption is smoothed across periods, the only possible allocations(
c1, d1
)
and
(
c2, d2
)
which satisfy this equality are such that c1 = d1 > c2 = d2
with e∗
(
γ1, d1
)
< e∗
(
γ2, d2
)
. First consumption is then higher for the high-
disutility individual and he prefers to concentrate consumption in the first period
of his life since he has lower chances to enjoy any consumption in the following
period.
2.3 The first best problem
We assume that the social planner is utilitarian and that he perfectly observes
individuals’ types. The economy is assumed to be in a steady state equilibrium
and the social planner can lend or borrow at a zero interest rate in order to
balance the budget at any given period. The resource constraint of the economy
is thus: ∑
i=1,2
ni
(
ci + π
(
ei
)
di
)
≤ w (4)
where
(
ci, di
)
is the consumption allocation of an individual of type i = 1, 2 and
ei is his effort level. The social planner chooses consumption paths as well as
effort levels in order to maximize
∑
i=1,2
ni
[
u
(
ci
)
+ π
(
ei
)
u
(
di
)
− γiei
]
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subject to (4). First order conditions of this problem yield:
π
(
ei
)
u′
(
di
)
u′ (ci)
= π
(
ei
)
(5)
π′
(
ei
)
u
(
di
) [
1−
u′
(
di
)
di
u (di)
]
= γi (6)
for any i = 1, 2. Obviously, condition (5) states that consumption should
be equalized across time and between agents with different types. The sec-
ond condition defines the optimal level of effort, e∗
(
γi, di
)
.7 The expression
u′
(
di
)
di/u
(
di
)
is assumed to be lower than 1 which is standard in the eco-
nomic literature that studies the welfare benefits related to longevity extension
and ensures that the value of a statistical life is sufficiently large.8 Here, the
individual level of effort is strictly positive only when life is worth living, i.e.
when this elasticity is lower than 1; otherwise, the optimal level of effort is zero.
Moreover, by comparison with the laissez-faire expression (3), the first best allo-
cation now includes an additional term, −u′
(
di
)
π′
(
ei
)
di. This corresponds to
the effect of effort on the budget set; in the first best, the social planner takes
into account that a higher effort might decrease second period consumption pos-
sibilities through a tightened resource constraint. In the first best, the optimal
level of effort is such that at this level, the marginal gain in utility due to in-
creased survival probability is equal to total marginal cost of effort (i.e. marginal
disutility of effort and marginal decrease in utility due to smaller consumption
possibilities). Comparing (3) with (6), we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For any type of individual, the first best level of effort is lower
than the laissez-faire one.
Hence, the effect of longevity-enhancing behavior on the budget set is now
accounted for, which was not the case in the preceding laissez-faire section. This
result is in line with Becker and Philipson (1998) who studied the trade-off be-
tween the quantity (i.e. longer lifetime) and the quality (i.e. less resources per
7The second order condition is always satisfied under our assumptions.
8See Murphy and Topel (2003) and Becker et al. (2005).
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period) of life and how individuals’ attitude toward life extension affects mor-
tality contingent claims. Note however that for very high values of a statistical
life (equivalently, small levels of u′
(
di
)
di/u
(
di
)
), first best levels of effort tend
to the laissez faire ones; in this case, nothing is more important than being alive
and the effect on the resource constraint only has a marginal impact. Our second
set of results is summarized hereafter:
Proposition 3 The first best allocation is characterized by
(i) ci = di = c¯ ∀i,
(ii) e∗
(
γ1, c¯
)
< e∗
(
γ2, c¯
)
for any given c¯ and γ1 > γ2.
Point (i) directly follows from the assumption of no pure time preferences
and from the double additivity assumption (i.e. both additively separable in-
dividual preferences and a utilitarian social planner); this jointly leads to the
equalization of consumptions across periods and between agents with different
survival chances in the first best.9 The social planner also requires lower effort
from the individual with lower taste for effort so that he has smaller survival
probability. Since the expected lifetime consumption of an individual of type γi
is equal to ci+π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
di, one finds that the expected consumption is higher
for the high-taste individual and the first best optimum transfers resources from
low-taste (low-survival) individuals toward high-taste (high-survival) ones.
Finally, this first best allocation cannot be decentralized through a tax-and-
transfer scheme since effort is non-monetary. This is why in the following section,
we resort to a constrained first best in which the social planner lets individuals
choose their effort level and can eventually influence it through the allocation of
consumptions.
9As shown in Bommier (2006) and Bommier et al. (2007a, b), this assumption implies that
individuals are risk neutral toward the length of life so that a utilitarian social planner corrects
for intra-period inequality but does not take into account inter-period inequality (and thus, the
fact that one individual might live longer than the other).
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3 Full information with non monitored effort
3.1 The optimum
Since effort takes a non monetary form in our framework, it is reasonable to
assume that the social planner has no control on it. Thus, we now assume
that the social planner only allocates consumptions, knowing that it may have
consequences on individuals’ choice of effort. In this section, the social planner
perfectly observes individuals’ types.
The timing of the problem is the following one. First, the social planner
allocates consumptions and second, individuals choose their level of effort. Pro-
ceeding by backward induction, we first determine the optimal level of effort and
then solve the social planner’s problem. In this framework, for any i = 1, 2,
the optimal level of effort e∗
(
γi, di
)
is defined by (3) and satisfies point (i) of
Proposition 1.
The social planner then chooses consumption paths of individuals with types
γ1 and γ2 taking into account that effort depends on individual’s type and on
second period consumption. This amounts to solve the following problem:
max
ci,di
∑
i=1,2
ni
[
u
(
ci
)
+ π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
u
(
di
)
− γie∗
(
γi, di
)]
s.to
∑
i=1,2
ni
[
ci + π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
di
]
≤ w
First order conditions with respect to ci and di are respectively:
u′
(
ci
)
= λ (7)
u′
(
di
)
= λ
[
1 +
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
π (e∗ (γi, di))
di
de∗
(
γi, di
)
ddi
]
(8)
Comparing these two conditions and recalling that de∗
(
γi, di
)
/ddi > 0 for
any given γi, we now find that with non monitored effort, present consumption
should be higher than future consumption (since the expression inside brackets
is greater than 1). The explanation is related to the optimal level of effort. As
mentioned in Proposition 2, the first best level of effort should be lower than
in the laissez-faire due to the effect of effort on the resource constraint. Thus,
11
one way to make individuals exert less effort is to provide them with less second
period consumption. This limits the increase of individuals’ survival probability
and thus the negative impact of effort on the resource constraint. This result is
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Under full information with non monitored effort, ci > di for
any individual with type γi.
We further study how consumptions should be allocated between individuals
with different tastes for effort. First, from condition (7), we obtain that first
period consumption is equalized between individuals; this directly follows from
our assumptions on individual preferences and on the social welfare function but
also from the fact that first period consumption has no impact on effort levels.
On the contrary, second period consumption might be differentiated depending
on our assumptions on survival probabilities and on per period utility. Rewriting
condition (8) in terms of elasticities of substitution, we obtain
u′
(
di
)
= λ
[
1 + επ(e∗(γi,di)) × εe∗(γi,di),di
]
(9)
where επ(e∗(γi,di)) and εe∗(γi,di), di are respectively the elasticity of the survival
probability with respect to effort and the elasticity of effort with respect to future
consumption and have the following expressions:
επ(e∗(γi,di)) =
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
e∗
(
γi, di
)
π (e∗ (γi, di))
εe∗(γi,di), di =
de∗
(
γi, di
)
ddi
di
e∗ (γi, di)
= −
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
π′′ (e∗ (γi, di)) e∗ (γi, di)
u′
(
di
)
di
u (di)
Note that in the last line, we have replaced for the expression of de∗
(
γi, di
)
/ddi.
Surprisingly, one finds that if π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
has constant elasticity with respect
to effort, not only επ(e∗(γi,di)) is equal to a constant but also εe∗(γi,di), di depends
only on future consumption levels and not on individuals’ types.10 Thus, in this
10Looking at expressions (3) (12) in Appendix A, this result depends on the (linear) form of
the effort disutility. Assuming convex disutility may yield different result.
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special case, (9) is independent of γi and future consumption is equalized between
individuals. Yet, if the elasticity of the survival probability is non constant, the
result is ambiguous and d1 might be greater or lower than d2. This is stated
formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Consider two groups of individuals with types γ1 and γ2 such
that γ1 > γ2. Under full information with non monitored effort,
(i) First period consumption is equalized between individuals, ci = c¯ ∀i.
(ii) Second period consumption is such that
- if the survival probability has constant elasticity with respect to effort,
d1 = d2,
- otherwise, d1 ≷ d2 if and only if
επ(e∗(γ1,d1)) × εe∗(γ1,d1),d1 ≶ επ(e∗(γ2,d2)) × εe∗(γ2,d2),d2
Obviously, our results strongly depend on the form of the survival proba-
bility. In the following, we consider cases in which the survival probability has
decreasing elasticity with respect to effort.11 Assuming some specific functional
forms for the survival probability, we show in Appendix that second period con-
sumption should be higher for the high-taste-for-effort individual:
Proposition 6 If individuals’ survival probability can be modelled as π (e) =
log e or π (e) = e/ (1 + e), the full information optimum with non monitored
effort yields that d1 < d2.
The social planner then rewards the individual with high taste for effort by
giving him higher level of second period consumption; equivalently, he gives more
to the individual who is more likely to survive. The effort for the high-taste
individual as well as his survival probability are then higher. Thus, expected
lifetime consumptions are such that c¯+ π
(
e∗
(
γ2, d2
))
d2 > c¯+π
(
e∗
(
γ1, d1
))
d1
11For instance, it is proven that in the case of physical activity, there exists an optimal level
of effort above which additionnal effort may effectively decrease survival chances.
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and the optimal allocation with non-monitored effort transfers resources from the
low-taste for effort individual toward the high-taste for effort individual. Note
that this result is still valid for constant elasticity of substitution of the survival
probability but the level of the transfer is lower than under decreasing elasticity.
3.2 Decentralization
The above optimum can be decentralized through lump sum transfers from the
low-taste toward the high-taste-for-effort individual (equivalently from the low-
survival toward the high-survival individual). Moreover, individual’s savings are
invested on a perfect annuity market so that comparing (7) and (9) with (2), we
find that the decentralisation of this optimum is achieved throught the taxation
of annuitized savings. If the elasticity of the survival probability with respect to
effort is constant, the level of this tax, ti is identical between individuals with
different for effort and equal to:12
ti =
επ(e∗(γi,di)) × εe∗(γi,di),di
1 + επ(e∗(γi,di)) × εe∗(γi,di),di
Otherwise, whether t1 ≷ t2 depends on the form of the survival probability.
Under specific forms for the survival probability such that it has decreasing
elasticity of substitution (as in Proposition 6), one obtains that this tax is higher
for the individual with low taste of effort
t1 =
επ(e∗(γ1,d1)) × εe∗(γ1,d1),d1
1 + επ(e∗(γ1,d1)) × εe∗(γ1,d1),d1
> t2 =
επ(e∗(γ2,d2)) × εe∗(γ2,d2),d2
1 + επ(e∗(γ2,d2)) × εe∗(γ2,d2),d2
4 Asymmetric information with non monitored effort
4.1 Theoretical results
In this section, we assume that the social planner neither observes individuals’
tastes for effort nor their levels of effort.13 Using results of Proposition 5, it
12For example, if π (e) = eε with elasticity of substitution ε, the tax is simply equal to
t
i =
ε
ε−1
u′(di)di
u(di)[
1 + ε
ε−1
u′(di)di
u(di)
]
13Note that the social planner observes survival probabilities ex-post but it does not give
additional information on types since survival can always be due to luck and not because the
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is straightforward that with constant elasticity of the survival probability with
respect to effort, the first best allocation is implementable under asymmetric
information. On the contrary, if the survival probability has decreasing elasticity
and if the social planner proposes first best bundles, the individual with low taste
for effort (type-1 individual) has interest in claiming to have high taste for effort
and to enjoy higher consumption d2.14 Then, to avoid mimicking behavior, we
add an incentive constraint to the preceding problem such that:
max
c1,d1,c2,d2
∑
i=1,2
ni
[
u
(
ci
)
+ π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
u
(
di
)
− γie∗
(
γi, di
)]
s.to
∑
i=1,2
ni
[
ci + π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
di
]
≤ w
s.to
u
(
c1
)
+ π
(
e∗
(
γ1, d1
))
u
(
d1
)
− γ1e∗
(
γ1, d1
)
≥
u
(
c2
)
+ π
(
e∗
(
γ1, d2
))
u
(
d2
)
− γ1e∗
(
γ1, d2
)
The trade-offs between two-period consumptions for type 1 and type 2 are then:
u′
(
d1
)
u′ (c1)
=
(
1 +
π′
(
e∗
(
γ1, d1
))
π (e∗ (γ1, d1))
d1
de∗
(
γ1, d1
)
dd1
)
(10)
u′
(
d2
)
u′ (c2)
=
(
1 +
π′
(
e∗
(
γ2, d2
))
π (e∗ (γ2, d2))
d2
de∗
(
γ2, d2
)
dd2
)
×
 1− µn2
1− µ
n2
π(e∗(γ1,d2))
π(e∗(γ2,d2))
(11)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the incentive constraint. The
trade-off between present and future consumptions is equivalent to the full in-
formation case for type-1 individual. Quite the opposite, for the individual with
taste for effort γ2, it is distorted downward since the expression inside brackets
is lower than 1. Our results are summarized hereafter:
Proposition 7 Assume two groups of individuals with taste for effort γ1 and
γ2 such that γ1 > γ2. Under asymmetric information with non monitored effort,
(i) there is no distortion at the top for the individual with type 1 and c1 > d1,
individual lied on his type.
14Since effort and consumption are positively correlated, an increase in consumption not only
increases direct utility derived from consumption but also survival and total effort disutility.
However, using the envelop theorem, it is easy to prove that marginal utility with respect to
future consumption is always positive. Thus, type-1 individual has always interest in lying on
his type under decreasing elasticity.
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(ii) the trade off between two-period consumptions is distorted downward for the
individual with type 2 and c2 ≷ d2.
Then, under asymmetric information, the distortion for the individual with
low taste for effort is equivalent to the full information case. The social planner
simply imposes a distortion on this individual so as to make him exert lower
effort, as in the full information case. This is kind of “no distortion at the top”
result for the individual who would like to lie on his type.
On the contrary, the individual with high taste for effort now faces an ad-
ditional distortion, due to the introduction of the incentive constraint so that
the marginal rate of substitution is distorted downward compared to the full
information case. Thus, under asymmetric information, the high taste for effort
individual faces two distortions with countervailing effects. Indeed, in (11), the
first expression inside parenthesis is greater than 1 and is related to the effect
of effort on the resource constraint; as under full information, the social planner
wants to induce lower level of effort by encouraging present consumption rela-
tive to future consumption. Afterward, we call it the effort effect. On the other
hand, the second expression inside brackets is lower than 1 and is related to the
incentive constraint. Under asymmetric information, it is desirable to encour-
age future consumption for this individual. This makes the low-taste-for-effort
individual less interested in the allocation proposed to the high-taste individual
as it would provide him with too high a level of future consumption relative to
present consumption. It is a way to relax an otherwise binding self-selection
constraint. Further on, we call it the incentive effect.
Thus, if the effort effect dominates the incentive effect, early consumption
should still be encouraged relatively to future consumption for individual 2; yet,
the difference between present and future consumption will be lower than in the
full information case. It is also possible that future consumption is preferred if
the incentive effect dominates the effort effect.
Finally, we study how to implement these results. Comparing (10) and (11)
with their laissez-faire counterparts, we find that this optimum can be decen-
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tralized through lump sum transfers and taxes on annuities. Using the same
reasoning as in the preceding section, these taxes have the following expressions:
t1 =
επ(e∗(γ1,d1)) × εe∗(γ1,d1),d1
1 + επ(e∗(γ1,d1)) × εe∗(γ1,d1),d1
> 0
t2 =
(
1 + επ(e∗(γ2,d2)) × εe∗(γ2,d2),d2
)
×
[
1− µ
n2
1− µ
n2
π(e∗(γ1,d2))
π(e∗(γ2,d2))
]
− 1
(
1 + επ(e∗(γ2,d2)) × εe∗(γ2,d2),d2
)
×
[
1− µ
n2
1− µ
n2
π(e∗(γ1,d2))
π(e∗(γ2,d2))
] ≷ 0
This tax is identical to the full information case for the low-taste-for-effort indi-
vidual. On the contrary for the high-taste individual, whether he faces a positive
or negative tax now depends on the direction of the overall distortion. If total
distortion goes upward (i.e. the effort effect dominates the incentive effect), a
positive tax on annuities is desirable but it is lower than under full information
since the incentive effect partly neutralizes the effort effect. Early consump-
tion is still favoured for this individual. On the opposite, if the distortion goes
downward, he will benefit from a subsidy (negative tax) on annuities and future
consumption will be encouraged for this individual. A positive or negative tax
on annuities is way to make the problem incentive compatible under asymmetric
information.
In the next subsection, we simulate our model and study how the direction
of the overall distortion depends on the distance between types
(
γ1 − γ2
)
and
on the elasticity of per period utility with respect to consumption.
4.2 Numerical examples
Consider the following specifications for the various components of our model.
Types
(
γ1, γ2
)
are distributed on ]0, 1] and we set w = 10. We first consider
three possible cases: a case where types are very close, a case where γ1 = 2γ2
and a case where types are very different. The utility function has the following
form, u (c) = cε/ε with constant elasticity, ε. For the moment, we fix ε = 0.2.
The survival probability is modeled as π (e) = e/ (1 + e) which ensures that it
is always lower than one and that it has decreasing elasticity. In the following
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table, we present a first set of results under full information (FI) and asymmetric
information (AI):
types
(
γ1, γ2
)
c d e π (e)
u′(di)
u′(ci)
(1, 0.9) individual 1 FI 6.28141 5.8404 1.66765 0.625139 1.05996
AI 6.95551 6.47464 1.6953 0.628983 1.05899
individual 2 FI 6.28141 5.8738 1.81356 0.644578 1.05514
AI 5.60584 5.2548 1.7824 0.640598 1.05309
(1, 0.5) individual 1 FI 6.092 5.6623 1.6594 0.623976 1.06026
AI 6.85537 6.38039 1.69135 0.628439 1.05912
individual 2 FI 6.092 5.828 2.77183 0.734877 1.03608
AI 5.32801 5.20183 2.7292 0.731846 1.01936
(1, 0.1) individual 1 FI 5.80636 5.39381 1.64652 0.622145 1.06073
AI 6.69415 6.22867 1.68488 0.627544 1.05935
individual 2 FI 5.80636 5.70996 7.41683 0.88119 1.01348
AI 4.92035 5.08828 7.32036 0.879813 0.973509
Table 1: Optimal allocations with non monitored effort
This table confirms the findings of Proposition 6 that under full information,
future consumption is always higher for type-2 individuals. These results are yet
more interesting when studying the optimal allocations under asymmetric infor-
mation. First period consumption is not smoothed anymore between individuals
and type-1 individual (with low taste for effort) always gets higher levels of first
period consumption as well as future consumption; he also exerts lower level of
effort but has lower survival probability. In the last column, we present the level
of the distortion under both full and asymmetric information. As expected, early
consumption is always encouraged for type-1 individual. For the individual with
high taste for effort (type-2 individual), we find that the level of the distortion
under asymmetric information is always lower than under full information but
whether it is greater or lower than 1 depends on the distance between the γs. For
very close levels of the γs and for a ratio of 2, this distortion is still greater than
1; thus the effort effect dominates the incentive effect and early consumption is
still preferred. On the opposite, when individuals’ types are very different, this
distortion is lower than 1 so that it is desirable to encourage future consumption
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relatively to early consumption.
In order to verify our conjectures on the possible link between distance in
types and the size of the distortion (whether it is greater or smaller than 1), we
last check the level of the overall distortion for type-2 individual, u′
(
d2
)
/u′
(
c2
)
by fixing γ1 = 1 but making γ2 decrease. We also compute it for different values
of ε:
γ2 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
ε = 0.1 0.9971 0.9727 0.9480 0.9230 0.8973 0.8707 0.8424 0.8112 0.7738
ε = 0.2 1.0531 1.0451 1.0368 1.0283 1.0194 1.0099 0.9996 0.9879 0.9735
ε = 0.5 1.2007 1.1798 1.1596 1.1399 1.1203 1.1006 1.0803 1.0587 1.0336
Table 2: Distortion levels for type-2 individual under asymmetric information
This table yields two types of comments related to both the levels of γ2 and
of ε. First, let us recall that the smaller is u′ (c) c/u (c) = ε, the higher is the
value of life so that the laissez-faire level of effort tends to the optimal one (as
we showed in Section 2.3) and there is no need to correct for effort. Thus, under
asymmetric information, the distortion in (11) is always smaller than 1 since
the so-called effort effect does not play any role and there exists only one type
of distortion which is related to the incentive constraint. In this case, future
consumption is always encouraged for type-2 individual. On the contrary, if ε is
high, the value of life is relatively small so that first best effort is very different
from its laissez faire level. In this case, the effort effect might dominate the
incentive effect and the distortion in (11) is likely to be greater than 1. This
results in encouraging relatively more early consumption.
It is also interesting to see that the distance between types plays a crucial role
in determining whether the distortion is greater or lower than 1 under asymmet-
ric information. Indeed, for a given ε, the higher is the gap between types, the
smaller is the level of the distortion for a type-2 individual and the more likely
it is to be lower than one. For instance, when ε = 0.2, the level of the distortion
is first greater and then lower than one as γ2 decreases. Hence, as long as types
are not very different, the effort effect dominates and present consumption is
preferred while if types are very different, it will be the reverse. The explanation
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is the following one. For a given ε, when the distance in types is small, first best
allocations
(
ci, di
)
of type-1 and type-2 are almost identical so that the incen-
tive effect might be less “constraining” than the effort effect under asymmetric
information. In such a case, the effort effect dominates the incentive effect and
the distortion is greater than 1. On the opposite, when types are very different,
type-2 individual obtains much higher level of second period consumption than
type-1 under full information so that the incentive effect will be more constrain-
ing than the effort effect; in this case, the incentive effect dominates and the
overall distortion is lower than 1. It results in encouraging future consumption
for the individual with high-taste for effort under asymmetric information.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the problem of redistribution among individuals who can
influence their longevity by exerting efforts. We assume that these efforts are
non-monetary (such as physical activity) so that the social planner has no di-
rect control on it. Thus, in our framework, the social planner only allocates
consumptions while the individual chooses his level of effort depending on his
taste for effort and on the expected level of future consumption. We first high-
light the trade-off between the quantity and the quality of life by explaining the
relations between survival probabilities, effort and the return of annuities. On
the one hand, higher effort increases expected length of life but it also decreases
consumption possibilities through a decrease in the return of the annuity. We
showed that in the laissez-faire, the effort level is higher than in the first best, be-
cause in the former, the individual does not integrate the consequence of higher
effort over his budget constraint. Thus, under full information and non mon-
itored effort, we find that early consumption is encouraged relative to future
consumption as a way to make individuals exert less effort. Under asymmetry of
information, the distortion in the trade-off between present and future consump-
tion is identical to the full information case for the individual with low taste for
effort. However, for the high-taste individual, the distortion is lower than under
full information as the incentive effect partly neutralizes the effort effect. Future
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consumption may even be preferred to present consumption for this individual
when individuals have very different tastes for effort. In order to clarify these
results, the following table provides a summary
Consumptions Effort Survival Probability
Laissez Faire c1 = d1 > c2 = d2
First Best c1 = d1 = c2 = d2
Full Information MH
Constant Elasticity of π (.) → c1 = c2 > d1 = d2 e1 < e2 π1 < π2
Decreasing Elasticity of π (.)→ d1 < d2 < c1 = c2
Assym.Info MH
Decreasing Elasticity
c1 > c2, d1 > d2, c1 > d1
c2 ≷ d2
Table 3: Recapitulative table
We also analyzed how to decentralize these optima through a tax-and-transfer
scheme. Under full information, a positive tax on annuities is desirable for both
types of individuals. Under asymmetry of information, a tax on annuities is
still desirable for the low-taste-for-effort individual but whether the tax should
be positive or negative for the high-taste-for-effort individual depends on the
distance between types and on the elasticity of per period utility with respect to
consumption.
There are several directions in which the model could be extended. For
instance, we have neglected the fact that life expectancy depends on intrin-
sic characteristics (such as gender) and that efforts and genetics may be corre-
lated. Adding this additional characteristic, how would our model be modified?
Moreover, we assume additively separable preferences which imply temporal risk
neutrality. Relaxing this assumption may modify substantially our results. An-
swering these questions is on our research agenda.
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Appendix
A Laissez Faire
Proof of Proposition 1: Fully differentiating (3), we find that effort decreases
with γi and increases with di:
de∗
(
γi, di
)
dγi
=
1
π′′ (e∗ (γi, di))u (di)
< 0
de∗
(
γi, di
)
ddi
= −
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
u′
(
di
)
π′′ (e∗ (γi, di))u (di)
> 0 (12)
B First best
Proof of Proposition 3: Using (5), we obtain point (i) of Proposition 3. Point
(ii) is obtained from full differentiation of (6):
dei
dγi
=
γi
π′′ (ei) [u (di)− u′ (di)di]
< 0
C Full information with moral hazard
C.1 Proof of Proposition 5
The Lagrangian of the problem is
£ =
∑
i=1,2
ni
[
u
(
ci
)
+ π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
u
(
di
)
− γiv
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))]
+λ
w− ∑
i=1,2
ni
[
ci + π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
di
]
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. First
order conditions with respect to ci and di are:
u′
(
ci
)
− λ = 0 (13)[
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
u
(
di
)
−γiv′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
− λπ′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
di
]
de∗
(
γi, di
)
ddi
+ π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
)) [
u′
(
di
)
− λ
]
= 0 (14)
Replacing for (3) into (14) and rearranging terms, one obtains
π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
u′
(
di
)
− π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
λ
[
1 +
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
π (e∗ (γi, di))
di
de∗
(
γi, di
)
ddi
]
= 0
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Replacing for επ(e∗(γi,di)) and εe∗(γi,di), di in the above expression, one obtains
(9). Replacing for (12) in the above expression, we obtain
u′
(
di
)
− λ
[
1−
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))2
π (e∗ (γi, di))π′′ (e∗ (γi, di))
u′
(
di
)
di
u (di)
]
= 0 (15)
Let assume that π (e) has constant elasticity denoted ε with ε < 1 and e ∈ [0, 1].
Thus,
u′
(
di
)
− λ
[
1−
ε
ε− 1
u′
(
di
)
di
u (di)
]
= 0
so that first order condition on di is independent of individual’s types and d1 = d2
for γ1 > γ2.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Assume that π (e) = log e with e ∈ [1, exp]. In this case,
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))2
(π (e∗ (γi, di))π′′ (e∗ (γi, di)))
= −
1
log e∗ (γi, di)
and (15) is equal to
u′
(
di
)
− λ
[
1 +
1
log e∗ (γi, di)
u′
(
di
)
di
u (di)
]
= 0
u′
(
di
)
− λ
[
1 +
1
π (e∗ (γi, di))
u′
(
di
)
di
u (di)
]
= 0 (16)
Using the implicit function theorem, one has
sign
(
ddi
dγi
)
= sign
∂
(
u′
(
di
)
− λ
[
1 + 1
π(e∗(γi,di))
u′(di)di
u(di)
])
∂γi

where the expression on the right hand side is equal to
λ
u′
(
di
)
di
u (di)
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
π (e∗ (γi, di))2
de∗
(
γi, di
)
dγi
which is negative since de∗
(
γi, di
)
/dγi < 0. Thus, d1 < d2 for γ1 > γ2.
Assume now that π (e) = e/ (1 + e). In this case,
π′
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))2
(π (e∗ (γi, di))π′′ (e∗ (γi, di)))
= −
1
2e∗ (γi, di)
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and (15) is equal to
u′
(
di
)
− λ
[
1 +
1
2e∗ (γi, di)
u′
(
di
)
di
u (di)
]
= 0
Again using the implicit function theorem, one obtains that ddi/dγi < 0 so that
d1 < d2 for γ1 > γ2.
D Asymmetric information with moral hazard
The Lagrangian of the problem under asymmetric information can be written as
£
(
c1, c2, d1, d2
)
=
∑
i=1,2
ni
[
u
(
ci
)
+ π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
u
(
di
)
− γie∗
(
γi, di
)]
+λ
w − ∑
i=1,2
ni
[
ci + π
(
e∗
(
γi, di
))
di
]
+µ
{
u
(
c1
)
+ π
(
e∗
(
γ1, d1
))
u
(
d1
)
− γ1e∗
(
γ1, d1
)
−u
(
c2
)
− π
(
e∗
(
γ1, d2
))
u
(
d2
)
+ γ1e∗
(
γ1, d2
) }
First order conditions of the second best problem simplify to:
u′
(
c1
)(
1 +
µ
n1
)
= λ
u′
(
c2
)(
1−
µ
n2
)
= λ
u′
(
d1
)(
1 +
µ
n1
)
= λ
[
1 +
π′
(
e∗
(
γ1, d1
))
π (e∗ (γ1, d1))
de∗
(
γ1, d1
)
dd1
d1
]
u′
(
d2
)(
1−
µ
n2
π
(
e∗
(
γ1, d2
))
π (e∗ (γ2, d2))
)
= λ
[
1 +
π′
(
e∗
(
γ2, d2
))
π (e∗ (γ2, d2))
de∗
(
γ2, d2
)
dd2
d2
]
So that the trade-offs between two-period consumptions for each type of indi-
vidual are equal to
u′
(
d1
)
u′ (c1)
=
(
1 +
π′
(
e∗
(
γ1, d1
))
π (e∗ (γ1, d1))
d1
de∗
(
γ1, d1
)
dd1
)
u′
(
d2
)
u′ (c2)
=
(
1 +
π′
(
e∗
(
γ2, d2
))
π (e∗ (γ2, d2))
d2
de∗
(
γ2, d2
)
dd2
)
×
 1− µn2
1− µ
n2
π(e∗(γ1,d2))
π(e∗(γ2,d2))

Since π
(
e∗
(
γ1, d2
))
< π
(
e∗
(
γ2, d2
))
, the expression inside brackets is always
lower than 1.
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